

Message Text

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TO USDEL ACAPULCO IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

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TOSEC 140

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IS

SUBJECT: ISRAELI GOVERNMENT CRISIS POSSIBLE AS RESULT OF
AGRANAT REPORT

SUMMARY. PRELIMINARY AGRANAT COMMITTEE REPORT ON ISRAELI
MISTAKES IN PRE-WAR PERIOD WHICH DEALT SEVERELY WITH CHIEF
OF STAFF WHILE EXONERATING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, HAS
ARROUSED WIDE-SPREAD ISRAELI CRITICISM THAT POLITICIANS,
AND PARTICULARLY DEFMIN DAYAN, MUST ALSO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY.
REPORT WILL BE DEBATED IN SPECIAL APRIL 11
KNESSET SESSION AND OPPOSITION LIKUD WILL INTRODUCE MOTION
OF NO CONFIDENCE. NRP MIGHT JOIN LIKUD IN CALL ON GOVERNMENT
TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR IDF FAILURES AND IF SO,
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PRIMIN MEIR'S GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN JEOPARDY. GIVEN HIGH

STATE OF TENSION ON SYRIAN FRONT AND GENERAL DISTASTE FOR YET ANOTHER PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY, OUR ESTIMATE NOW IS THAT GOVERNMENT WILL WIN CONFIDENCE VOTE. BUT EVEN IF GOI SUCCEEDS APRIL 11 IN VOTE STRONG PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE FOR RESIGNATION OF DEFMIN DAYAN WHICH COULD LEAD TO PERIOD OF INCREASING INSTABILITY AND RENEWED CRISIS.

1. APRIL 2 PRELIMINARY AGRANAT COMMITTEE REPORT ON FAILURES IN ISRAELI COMMAND STRUCTURE IN PERIOD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OCTOBER WAR WILL BE FOCUS OF SPECIAL APRIL 11 KNESSET SESSION. GOVERNMENT CALLED SPECIAL SESSION DURING PASSOVER RECESS TO PRESENT STATEMENT

ON REPORT. OPPOSITION LIKUD WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SESSION TO INTRODUCE MOTION OF NO CONFIDENCE. LIKUD IS CLAIMING GOVERNMENT MUST DRAW APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM REPORT AND RESIGN.

2. LIKUD HAS REPORTEDLY FOUND ALLY IN NRP KNESSET FACTION WHICH APRIL 4 CALLED ON GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURES IN IDF AND RESIGN. NRP WILL NOT MAKE ITS FINAL DECISION ON ITS KNESSET VOTE UNTIL APRIL 8, BUT THERE IS POSSIBILITY PARTY MIGHT USE AGRANAT REPORT AS EXCUSE FOR LEAVING GOVERNMENT IN ATTEMPT TO HEAL SERIOUS INTERNAL PARTY BREACH CAUSED BY DECISION TO JOIN GOVERNMENT IN FACE OF CHIEF RABBINATE OPPOSITION. THOUGH UNITED LABOR ALIGNMENT COULD PROBABLY STAVE OFF THREAT TO GOVERNMENT, ALIGNMENT IS FAR FROM UNITED ON THIS ISSUE.

3. INTERIM REPORT DEALT SEVERELY WITH CHIEF OF STAFF ELAZAR WHO CONTESTED FINDINGS IN IS LETTER OF RESIGNATION. ON OTHER HAND, REPORT FULLY EXONERATED PRIMIN MEIR AND FOUND THAT DEFMIN WAS NOT OBLIGED TO DO OTHER THAN HE DID IN PRE-WAR PERIOD. DAYAN SUPPORTERS READING THIS AS FULL EXONERATION OF DEFMIN AND CLAIM SUBJECT NOW CLOSED. BUT FORMER COS ELAZAR IN RESIGNATION LETTER CONTENTED THAT DEFMIN WAS HIGHEST OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY IN PRE-WAR PERIOD AND HAD ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO COS. ELAZAR ASKED WHY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES COS SHOULD CONFIDENTIAL

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HAVE REACHED CONCLUSIO,S WHICH DEFMIN WAS UNABLE TO REACH. ELAZAR CONCLUDED THAT COMMITTEE DID NOT TREAT COS AND DEFMIN EQUALLY. MOST ISRAELI NEWSPAPERS AGREE WITH THRUST OF ELAZAR'S COMMENTS AND CALL FOR CLOSER SCRUTINY OF DAYAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES.

4. WITH DAYAN UNDER ATTACK FROM ALL SIDES, HIS STRONG INTERNAL OPPOSITION IN LABOR PARTY IS RELIEVED OF

PREVIOUSLY EXISTING CONSTRAINT THAT HE COULD TAKE HIS RAFI FACTION OUT OF LABOR ALIGNMENT AND GO IT ALONE OR JOIN RIGHT-WING OPPOSITION. RAFI SUPPORTERS ARE UNLIKELY TO FOLLOW A DISCREDITED DAYAN INTO POLITICAL LIMBO, AND HE COULD HARDLY JOIN LIKUD WHICH IS IMPLICITLY ATTACKING HIM PERSONALLY. THUS, LONG KNIVES ARE ONCE AGAIN OUT FOR DAYAN AND HIS FUTURE DEPENDS INCREASINGLY ON PRIMIN'S SUPPORT.

5. THOUGH PRIMIN'S PERSONAL POSITION WAS PRESUMABLY STRENGTHENED BY AGRANAT COMMITTEE REPORT, SHE MAY FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DEFEND DAYAN WITHIN ALIGNMENT AND STILL HOLD PARTY COMPLETELY TOGETHER ON NO CONFIDENCE MOTION. NOR CAN SHE COUNT ON SUPPORT OF LEFT-WING SPLINTER

PARTIES IN KNESSET. SACRIFICE OF DAYAN BEFORE CONFIDENCE VOTE, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON POSSIBLE NRP DECISION TO VOTE AGAINST GOI WHICH, IF MADE, WOULD BE FOR INTERNAL PARTY REASONS. ALSO, RAFI MEMBERS WILL EXPECT LABOR PARTY TO PUT UP FIGHT FOR DAYAN WHATEVER THEIR FINAL POSITION ON STAYING IN LABOR PARTY MIGHT BE IF DAYAN WERE ULTIMATELY DUMPED. DAYAN, FOR HIS PART, HAS SAID CATEGORICALLY HE WILL NOT RESIGN.

6. HIGH TENSION ON SYRIAN FRONT WILL WORK TO MRS. MEIR'S ADVANTAGE IN CONVINCING HER COLLEAGUES THAT ISRAEL CANNOT AFFORD POLITICAL INSTABILITY NOW. THIS MAY GIVE PRIMIN EDGE SHE NEEDS TO RETAIN CONFIDENCE OF KNESSET. BUT SHE WILL STILL FACE SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO DAYAN FROM WITHIN LABOR PARTY WHICH COULD LEAD TO RENEWED CRISIS. IF SHE SHOULD LOSE VOTE OF CONFIDENCE, MRS. MEIR WOULD BE OBVIOUS CHOICE TO TRY AND FORM NEW GOVERNMENT. BUT SUCH CONFIDENTIAL

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A BLOW COULD ALSO CAUSE HER DEFINITELY TO STEP DOWN. GIVEN THE DISARRAY IN THE LABOR PARTY A PERIOD OF HIGH POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY AND INSTABILITY WOULD THEN ENSUE AS PARTY SOUGHT SUCCESSOR AND TRIED TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT OR CALLED FOR NEW ELECTIONS.

7. OUR ESTIMATE NOW IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL WIN CONFIDENCE VOTE BECAUSE OF EFFECTS OF CONCERN OVER SYRIAN FRONT AND GENERAL PUBLIC DISTASTE FOR NEW ELECTIONS OR FOR ANOTHER PROTRACTED PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION HAGGLING. BUT ESTIMATE IS MADE WITH CONSIDERABLE RESERVE; THIS IS TIME OF UNIQUE TURBULENCE AND HIGH EMOTION ON ISRAELI POLITICAL SCENE.

8. FOREGOING DRAFTED PRIOR TO RECEIPT TEL AVIV 2030 WHICH

WE ARE REPEATING TOSEC SINCE WE THINK YOU WILL FIND IT
USEFUL TO HAVE THESE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS FROM TEL
AVIV AND WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVES.

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